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The Waitangi Tribunal and the Regulation of Māori Protest
Juan Tauri and Robert Webb

Abstract
Much of the current academic and political discourse related the
development and operations of the Waitangi Tribunal over its first
twenty years portray it as a forum that provided Māori with a
meaningful avenue for settling Treaty grievances compared to the
formal legal systems performance in the preceding 100 years. In
contrast, we argue that from its inception and throughout much of the
1980s, the Waitangi Tribunal functioned primarily as an informal justice
forum that assisted the New Zealand state’s regulation of Māori Treaty
activism during the transition from a Fordist to a Post-Fordist mode of
capital accumulation.
Introduction
Despite the political rhetoric of successive governments around partnership and
a commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi, Māori Treaty rights remain contested,
as represented in the contemporary moment in legislation such as the Foreshore
and Seabed Act 2004. In this context, it is useful to reflect on an important
period of Crown and Māori relations, a period that marked a shift in recognising
longstanding Treaty rights through the development of a specific forum for
reviewing Māori Treaty grievances - the Waitangi Tribunal. The paper
examines the important formation period of the Tribunal in the early 1970s to
mid-1990s to illustrate two interrelated points: firstly the Tribunal's formation
poses a contradiction in that while it represented the first meaningful
examination of Crown breaches of Māori Treaty rights, it did so utilising an
‘informal’ review process that initially lacked the authority to impose binding
decisions; and secondly that during this period the Tribunal encouraged the
incorporation of Māori political and social activism into a government
controlled forum.
The establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal under the Treaty of Waitangi
Act 1975 appeared to offer Māori a meaningful process for airing their Treaty
grievances. Until the Tribunal’s formation, Māori Treaty activism had been
largely contained within the formal court processes of the justice system and
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governmental processes which decade upon decade denied recognition of Māori
rights.
The article focuses on two related questions: ‘why did the government
develop the Waitangi Tribunal at this juncture in State/Māori relations’, and
‘what function or purpose did the Tribunal serve at this point in State/Māori
relations’? We argue that the processes and mechanisms of the Tribunal
constituted a form of regulation resulting from the shift from a Fordist to a PostFordist mode of capitalist accumulation in New Zealand from the late 1970s.
More precisely, the formation of the Waitangi Tribunal and the first decade of
its operation can be understood as a state-centred informal justice forum that
assisted the state in regulating the potential hegemonic impact of Māori Treaty
activism.
The authors set out to contest claims that the Tribunal and its processes
are evidence that the New Zealand state had sought to address Treaty grievances
in a meaningful way, by providing Māori with a forum where they could ‘tell
their stories of dispossession’ (Maaka & Fleras 2005; see later discussion on
perspectives on the development and role of the Tribunal). In contrast, we
argue that although the regulation of Māori protest and Treaty grievances from
the inception of the Tribunal may not have been as overt as those employed
during the colonial context 1 , regulation existed nonetheless; albeit reconstituted
to reflect the developing Post-Fordist economic and regulatory environment.
We use regulation theory as a theoretical and conceptual framework to describe
the underlying socio-political drivers behind the development of the Tribunal at
a particular point in State/Māori relations.
The decision to focus on the early period of the operations of the Tribunal
(from 1975 to the late 1980s) was influenced firstly, by the fact that the
establishment of the Tribunal signalled the first instance in which the state had
organised a specific, institutionalised response to Māori activism after a long
period of disengagement from Māori and their Treaty issues. Prior to the
Tribunal the Government had considered the Treaty a ‘nullity’, and left it to the
courts to mediate (and consistently) repudiate Māori claims. And secondly,
much of the material generated by academics and researchers on the Tribunal
has focused on claims-making and the way in which the Tribunal dealt with
1

The colonial government legislated extensively in the nineteenth century to suppress Māori protests
against land sales. For example the Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863 allowed for the arrest of Māori
who were defined as rebels, generally defined as those who refused to sell, resulting in the
confiscation of their land (Ward, 1995).
22
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claims and government responses to their deliberations. In comparison, our
focus is on the drivers behind the development of the Tribunal at a particular
point in State-Māori relations, which we believe is an under-theorised and
researched area of the Tribunal’s history and operations.
The State’s response to Māori political dissent
As the historical record shows, Māori have long contested the ways in which the
Crown and the New Zealand Government have developed policies that directly
impact on them and their communities, particularly in relation to land
confiscation and breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. As stated earlier, most of
this activity had been dealt with through the state-dominated justice system, as
well as numerous petitions made by hapū and iwi to Government and the
Crown. However, by the late 1960s, the form and nature of Māori Treatyrelated activity began to change (Morris, 2003; Ward, 1993). Spurred by the
ethnic reorganisation of other colonised indigenes and influenced by the Black
civil rights movement of the 1960s, Māori began to more actively express their
discontent with assimilationist state policies which had been in place since the
1880s (Hill and Bonisch-Brednich, 2007, pp. 166-167; Poata-Smith, 1996;
2004). Thus in 1970, the protest organisation Ngā Tamatoa (Young Warriors)
began its career of confrontational politics against the New Zealand state
(Hazlehurst, 1993). In 1975 the then Labour Government was confronted by
the famous Hikoi (Great March) of numerous Māori from the far north to the
steps of Parliament in Wellington (Walker, 1987). And by the mid-1980’s,
organised Māori activist movements had emerged as a potent political force in
challenging the Government’s hegemony over State/Māori policy (Spoonley,
1989).
The impact of the rise of Māori protest activism on Government policy,
cannot be overstated (see Poata-Smith, 1996; 2004). For example, Catalanic
(2004) argues that one of the key drivers behind the rise of Māori activism was
the policy context that predominated in New Zealand for much of the twentieth
century, one based on assimilating Māori into ‘mainstream society’. To further
this policy, Government actively denied Māori grievances by ignoring Treaty
issues, while at the same time upholding the Treaty of Waitangi as the founding
document of the nation via the ‘joining together as one, the Crown and Māori’.
This continued, policy-driven denial of Treaty justice was instrumental in the
radicalisation of Māori Treaty politics. In relation to the link between Māori
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activism and the development of the Tribunal, Catalanic (2004, p. 11) states
that:
The policy assimilation that characterised New Zealand politics and
society acted as a constraint to the definition of Māori socio-economic
problems as connected to Crown injustices committed under the
Treaty.... [therefore]... the New Zealand politico-institutional
context... conditioned the way in which Māori sought to draw
attention to their problems – protest activism – that was eventually the
most successful factor in achieving the desired recognition.
The New Zealand state’s response to the hegemonic threat posed by the
radicalisation of Māori ethnic politics was swift. From the mid-1970s the
state’s policy and administrative response moved from being openly
assimilationist, to become imbued with the rhetoric of Māori bicultural ideology
(Tauri, 1998). Administrative responses included attempts to increase public
service responsiveness to Māori values, needs and aspirations; a new
distributive ideal based on the bicultural allocation of power and resources; and
acceptance of the Treaty of Waitangi as a policy blue print for reuniting ‘the
founding partners of New Zealand’ (Sissons, 1990). However, arguably the
most substantive response to the counter-hegemonic activity of Māori was the
Waitangi Tribunal.
The Waitangi Tribunal
The Waitangi Tribunal was established by the third Labour Government (19721975) with the passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 1975. At this point the
Tribunal was given the authority to inquire into and make recommendations to
the Crown (represented by the Government of the day) relating to Māori claims
against government actions that they believed contravened their rights under the
Treaty of Waitangi (Catalinac, 2004; Gibbs, 2006). The government’s
intentions for the Tribunal in terms of process and jurisdiction are summarised
by Ward (1993, p. 185) who writes that:
[I]n future, ‘any Māori’ or group of Māori who considered that they
were prejudicially affected by any act of the Crown or its agents, in
breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, could bring a claim
to a new tribunal, the Waitangi Tribunal. The Tribunal would act as
a commission of enquiry, with power to summon witnesses,
investigate widely and make recommendations (emphasis ours).
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However, despite the authority given to the Tribunal to investigate, initially the
jurisdiction of the new body was significantly constrained. In order to gain
Government support for the Tribunal in the first instance, one of its chief
architects, the late Matiu Rata (Rata, 1989) made a number of significant
concessions at Cabinet level relating to the powers of the proposed forum. For
example, the legislation that established the forum determined that after a
hearing was held with Māori complainants, the Tribunal was empowered to
only make recommendations to Government on how it should respond.
However, the Government was not bound by the Tribunal’s recommendations
and could ignore them at will (Sorrenson, 1995; Stokes, 1993). The legislation
also restricted the forum to considering claims emanating from violations of the
Treaty of Waitangi occurring after 1975 and purposely excluded historical
claims. These concessions meant that the vast majority of events considered by
Māori to represent significant breaches of the Treaty contract sat outside the
jurisdiction developed for the new entity.
The restrictions in jurisdiction caused concern amongst some Māori
commentators. Ward (1993) relates that as a result few claims were brought
before the Tribunal. However, this situation changed with the advent of a ‘bicultural tribunal process’ instigated by Chief Justice Eddie Durie in the early
1980s, and the content of initial reports that underlined the extensive scope and
nature of Māori grievances, and Crown breaches of Māori Treaty rights (see the
Waitangi Tribunal 1983; 1984). This, along with what Ward (1993, p.186)
describes as New Zealand middle class desire to ‘confront the historic sources
of Māori grievance and to offer redress’, saw these jurisdictional restrictions
partially lifted with passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985 by
the then recently elected Labour Government. The legislation extended the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction to enable it to consider Māori claims against violations
that took place after the signing of the Treaty in 1840 (Gibbs, 2006).
Despite significant constraints on the initial jurisdiction placed upon the
Tribunal, arguably little changed after the alterations provided for in the 1984
legislation. A range of authors (e.g. Robinson, 2002; Walker, 1989 and Ward,
1993) claim that the forum represented a significant change in the State’s
response to Māori Treaty grievances. In summing up this perspective, Catalanic
(2004, p. 10) writes that ‘[i]t (the Tribunal) has been heralded as marking the
beginning of a post-colonial era in New Zealand, in which Māori-Pākehā
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relations were being transformed from Pākehā dominance to negotiation
towards greater justice, equity and partnership’.
While undoubtedly the Tribunal signalled a change in formal
Government process for dealing with Māori grievances, the predominant
perspective on the drivers behind its formation have a tendency to
overemphasise the notion that it represented a significant transformation in
power relations between the state and Māori (see for example, Maaka and
Fleras, 2009). In comparison, we argue that a critical analysis focused on the
wider socio-political context developing in New Zealand at the time,
demonstrates that while the Tribunal represented a unique response, the purpose
and goals aligned with previous policy: namely continued state control over
Māori policy in light of changes in Māori grievance politics (see Gibbs, 2006
and Byrnes, 2004 for similar perspectives).
Key Questions of the Article
As outlined earlier, this article focuses on two inter-related questions: ‘why did
the government develop the Waitangi Tribunal at this juncture in State/Māori
relations’, and ‘what function or purpose did the Tribunal serve at this point in
State/Māori relations’? We argue that the answers lie in part in the wider
changes in capitalist development in New Zealand from a Fordist to a PostFordist regime of accumulation that began in the mid-to-late 1970s and
continued throughout the 1980s. In particular, we contend that the formation of
the Tribunal can be linked to the growing popularity of informal justice
processes as one mechanism employed by the modern state to regulate social
discontent and political protest in Post-Fordist contexts.
Fordist to Post-Fordist Regimes of Accumulation and Regulation
Regulation theory is useful for anchoring our examination of the New Zealand
state’s response to the increasing radicalisation of Māori political dissent, as it
provides a framework to analyse the changes in the forms of regulation of
populations and dissent in capitalist economies (Tickell & Peck, 1995).
Regulation theory attempts to explain, through an analysis of capitalist
development, the paradox between capitalism’s inherent tendency towards
instability and crisis and the constant drive to stabilise around a set of
institutions, norms and rules that support, or attempt to affect economic and
social stability (Amin, 1994).
Filion (2001, pp. 86-87) identifies two concepts at the core of regulation
theory. Regime of accumulation describes the organisation of society that aid
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economic activity and growth. Included in this domain of activity are the
political institutions, culture and systems of production. Mode of regulation
refers to the nature of mechanisms that bring society in line with the
requirements of the sphere of production. Amin (1994, p.8) describes the mode
of regulation as the ‘institutions and conventions which regulate and reproduce
a given accumulation regime through application across a wide range of areas,
including the law, state policy, political practices, industrial codes, governance
philosophies, rules of negotiation and bargaining, cultures of consumption and
social expectations’. These components of society can pattern behaviour in
ways that support the prevailing regime of accumulation. They provide the
social mores, beliefs and behaviours that support capitalist accumulation
(Painter and Goodwin, 1995).
Due to its contradictory and crisis-ridden tendencies, capital requires
forms of institutional regulation to support its continued reproduction and
legitimacy. Successive phases of capitalist development can be characterised
and analysed via the combination of regimes of accumulation and regulation
formed to support capital in that particular epoch (Jessop, 1994). Each regime
therefore has distinctive regulatory characteristics and regulation theory
attempts to explain transformations and differences between phases, such as the
movement from a Fordist regime to a Post-Fordist regime of accumulation that
occurred in many western capitalist societies from the immediate post-war
period onwards 2 .
Fordism
The Fordist regime of accumulation is generally characterised by mass
production and mass consumption, based upon the assembly-line production
techniques introduced in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century
by Henry Ford (Lipietz, 1992). As Wilkes (1993) notes, the concept of
assembly line production brings with it notions of universalism, uniformity,
repetition and rationality. The regulatory forms commonly ascribed to Fordism
include the welfare state 3 ; the role of trade unions in raising consumption
standards of working class and public servants; the media-inspired interest in
2

See Amin (1994) and Jessop (1995) for discussions about different theoretical explanations on the
emergence of Post-Fordism.
3
Lipietz (1986a) writes that the Fordist mode of regulation in Western jurisdictions often included a
welfare system designed to ensure every wage earner a guaranteed income in times of economic
hardship, with social legislation covering minimum wage levels and collective agreements. This
tends to institutionalise the class struggle by meeting some of the needs of workers, whilst allowing
capitalist accumulation, including the cheap appropriation of labour, to continue.
27
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mass consumption and the replacement of the extended family with the nuclear
model as the family formation of modern society (Falion, 2001). The Fordist
accumulatory epoch is generally considered to have lasted from the early 20th
century until the early 1980s depending on the particular jurisdiction, at which
time the supporting regulatory regimes began to lose their effectiveness. Lipietz
(1992) contends that crisis developed within Fordism's supposed universal and
rational system as real wages continued to increase and the cost of fixed capital
in relation to the total work force also rose, resulting in the retraction of profit
margins. This brought forth a new accumulative and regulatory regime - PostFordism.
Post-Fordism
In contrast to the Fordist epoch, Post-Fordism is characterised by a reduced role
in society for trade unions; a sharper division in the working class between core
and peripheral workers; and a greater flexibility of work practices, characterised
by diversification, rather than universalism. The Post-Fordist mode of
production has been described as involving the commodification and
privatisation of a range of collective services that were previously organised by
the Fordist state (Aglietta, 1979). The market reforms of the 1980s to mid1990s in New Zealand showed a decisive move towards this type of capital
organisation and accumulation, the privatisation of public works a clear
example of this process (Kelsey, 1993; 1997).
The move towards a Post-Fordist era of capital accumulation is
accompanied by the development of different modes of regulation. As with
modes of regulation characteristic of previous forms of capital accumulation,
they provide the means of institutionalising and confining class struggle and
potential hegemonic crises within state-controlled processes. These modes of
regulation will be different from those which characterise the containment and
control of class and ethnic relations in the Fordist era.
Despite the existence of the range of regulatory mechanisms listed above,
crises of capital within the Fordist era brought about the need for new and
innovative forms of regulation. The state’s response to the social disintegration
inherent in the crises of accumulation was to penetrate even more deeply into
civil society in order to restructure social relations into forms appropriate to the
emergence of a new, Post-Fordist regime of accumulation. This statement is
perhaps at odds with the common portrayal of the Post-Fordist state as less
regulatory and less involved in civil society (see Bonefield and Hollaway,
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1991). Arguably, this portrayal is overstated. The rise of Post-Fordism did not
see the state withdraw from its regulatory position, but instead re-shape itself
and seek to control the regulatory process in different, less obvious ways than
were constructed during the Fordist context. One less obvious form of state
regulatory control is the informal justice forum, of which the Waitangi Tribunal,
during its first decade or more of operation, greatly resembled.
Post-Fordist regulation and the rise of informal justice
Although the informal justice movement began initially during the latter part of
the Fordist epoch, it was during Post-Fordism that its products became key
components of the regulatory regime (Hofrichter, 1987). This was due in part
to the growing obsolescence and ineffectiveness of Fordist state institutions and
technologies of control that mediated class and social conflict during the earlier
epoch (Santos, 1995). These institutions, including the police, courts and child
care and protection, while still powerful and coercive, were no longer on their
own successful in reproducing what Spitzer (1982) calls politically docile
populations.
Arguably, the rise of radical socio-political movements, such as feminism
and indigenous activism, represented forms of political expression that
contested the legitimacy of existing modes of justice, and therefore regulation,
in the developing Post-Fordist context. These counter-hegemonic movements
were not easily contained within existing institutional processes designed to
support a Fordist accumulatory regime, thus prompting the development of
alternative modes of regulation (Hofrichter, 1987). We contend that informal
justice became a key Post-Fordist regulatory response in the New Zealand
context, and that a primary example of this ‘new form’ of regulation was the
Waitangi Tribunal.
Informal justice forums operate within Post-Fordism as pacificatory
mechanisms, drawing potentially hegemonic activity into state-designed and
dominated regimes. The Tribunal, particularly the way it operated throughout
much of the 1980s, neutralised conflict that could threaten the state or capital
accumulation by responding to legitimate Māori grievances in ways that
inhibited their transformation into serious ideological or physical challenges to
the authority of the state (Santos, 1982). Abel (1982) notes that informal justice
institutions of this kind are generally created and controlled by the respondents,
and rarely if ever by the grievant themselves.
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In order to neutralise conflict, informal mechanisms must be able to attract
disputants to their processes. State-centred informal justice seeks to achieve
this goal by appearing to operate as a neutral arbiter between the claimants and
the state. Inducing complainants to submit voluntarily to an informal justice
regime heightens the chances of their accepting any decisions made and
believing that ‘justice has been done’, despite the fact that the process is often
designed to limit the possibility of adverse decisions being made against state
interests. This has a neutralising effect on class conflict, by denying class
antagonisms and appealing to general standards of engagement that are
designed to promote capital-affirming modes of social cohesion. As Selva and
Bohm (1987, p. 50) note:
[T]he residual is the legitimation of state intervention and the return
to uncontrolled political power, delegalising social relations by
loosening power from formal controls. Thus, under the banner of
informalism and the rhetoric of personal justice, state authority and
political control has been partially obscured.
From this brief conceptual outline, it become possible to explain the emergence
of the Waitangi Tribunal during the rise of Post-Fordist phase of capital
accumulation in the New Zealand context and to illustrate how regulation of
Māori grievances and claims has changed in this transitional period. In the
following section, the Waitangi Tribunal is examined as a form of Post-Fordist
regulation, to demonstrate how the informal procedures it utilised throughout
the 1980s, channelled, then neutralised, the hegemonic potentialities of Māori
Treaty activism.
The Waitangi Tribunal as a Post-Fordist regulatory body
It could be argued that the Waitangi Tribunal is a belated attempt to
extend the hegemony of the rule of law over Māori, at a time when its
legitimacy is most directly under attack (Jane Kelsey, 1984).
Chris Wilkes (1993) suggests the Fordist period in New Zealand was broadly
located in the period 1935 to 1984, otherwise known as the ‘Long Boom’
(Nielson 1990, p. 81). During the 1960s the long boom was also sustained by
increasing productivity of labour through mass production techniques and the
rapid expansion of agricultural exports to the world economy, while the local
economy and the manufacturing sector were protected through a range of state
30
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subsidies and tariffs (Roper, 1993). The Fordist phase was brought into crises
in the late 1960s and early 1970s due to a falling rate of profit, rising foreign
debt and the shifts in the global export markets away from New Zealand
produce.
In the move towards Post-Fordist accumulation and regulation in the
1980s, the Labour government introduced free market policies, collectively
referred to as ‘Rogernomics’, which sought to restructure the New Zealand
economy through privatisation of state services and assets 4 . Ideologically
driven by new right economic theory, the process involved the reformation of
government control over key assets into separate State Owned Enterprises that
were required to be profit-focused. The enterprises could then be privatised and
subsequently offered for sale to the private sector. Resistance to these policies
came mainly from Māori, who saw the resources under the auspices of the
enterprises being further alienated to private control, leading to potential
breaches of their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi. Kelsey (1990, p.1) offers
an insight into this effect on Māori articulation of Treaty grievances when she
argues that:
The pace and scope of Rogernomics left a politically naive and
economically illiterate population stunned and apathetic. Significant
resistance came from just one quarter. Māori movements of the
1970s intensified throughout the 1980s as Māori reasserted their
rights under the Treaty of Waitangi to te tino rangatiratanga, or
complete authority over themselves and the country's key resources of
land, fisheries, waterways and minerals. With determination, and
sometimes desperation they challenged the government moves to vest
in the hands of private capital the resources guaranteed to te iwi
Māori in the Treaty.
Māori concerns focused upon the fact that by privatising resources, the
Government - as the Crown’s representative - was potentially divesting itself of
its Treaty responsibilities and, as result, their Treaty rights. The interests of
capital would be supported through legislation, while Māori would remain
economically and politically destitute, with little or no resources to exercise
4

Rogernomics refers to the plethora of neo-liberal economic and social policies developed by Roger
Douglas and the Labour government from 1984-1990. Douglas, the Minister of Finance from 19841988, argued that social goals and political considerations should be excluded from economic policy.
Douglas and Labour sought to construct a highly deregulated economy in New Zealand, driven by
market forces (Kelsey, 1997).
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sovereignty over (Kelsey, 1990). Rising Māori protests challenged the
legitimacy of the Government’s activities in this sphere, and through court
action they were eventually able to curtail the Government’s ability to
implement the reforms (Kelsey, 1993).
In order to allow capitalist
accumulation to continue unimpeded, attempts were made to channel Māori
activism into new forms of regulation, the most obvious being the Tribunal.
In the Fordist period, regulation of Māori protests against Treaty breaches
was maintained firstly by a formal legal system that denied the validity of the
Treaty, while emphasising parliamentary sovereignty as the sole legitimate
power in the country. Secondly, a paternalistic welfare state provided rising
living standards for both European and Māori. While Māori did not have
recognised Treaty rights, they had access to education, health and housing
support. However, by the mid 1970s, both the legal and welfare systems were
proving insufficient for regulating Māori Treaty grievances and political
activism. This situation necessitated the development of alternative forms of
regulation, which the state set about constructing throughout the late 1970s and
into the 1980s (Kelsey, 1990). It is possible to see that the decline of the Fordist
mode provided the conditions for the emergence of the Tribunal in 1975. The
Fordist state could not fully contain Māori concerns for Treaty rights through
the formal legal or parliamentary systems as it had done up to this point. As
Wilkes (1993. p.205) argues ‘[d]emands for the revitalisation of the culture and
language, and the return of wrongly appropriated tribal land, now sought a real
answer which the old settlements could not produce’.
Kelsey (1993) contends that in the 1980s the state could respond to Māori
Treaty activism in two ways. It could use coercion, as had previous
governments, with the potential for increasing Māori sense of grievance and,
therefore, conflict with the state. Or it could choose the path of passive
revolution, a term derived from Antonio Gramsci that denotes the ‘inclusion of
new social groups under the hegemony of the political order without the
expansion of real political control by the mass of population over politics’
(234). The State chose the latter, inducing and encouraging aggrieved Māori to
seek the Tribunal as neutral arbiter between the conflicted parties. Through the
Tribunal the State temporarily brought the counter-hegemonic activities of
Māori within its ambit until the challenge was defused, through both real (in
terms of limited fiscal settlements), and rhetorical concessions (e.g., formal
apologies) , and the promise of meaningful ‘change’ in State-Māori
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relationships. By drawing Māori protests off the street and national television
and into the Waitangi Tribunal (see Gagne, 2009, p. 42), the State was largely
able to regulate actions that could have presented a barrier to the developing
Post-Fordist regime of accumulation.
We are not suggesting that the Tribunal was intentionally created as a
regulatory body from its inception. Earlier we argued that the Tribunal was
created as a forum to hear grievances, a necessary response by the state to the
developing radicalisation of Māori activism. Jessop (1991) contends that the
emergence and subsequent dynamic of structures of regulation might be
endowed with a greater intentionality than is justified. In the case of the
Tribunal it would be an exaggeration to reduce its origin merely to the
formation of a mode of regulation in response to accumulation or ideological
crises. However, it is possible to view the emergence of the Tribunal as a PostFordist mode of regulation as a non-intentional, but nonetheless focussed
strategy, aimed at ensuring state-controlled direction of an already emergent
structure. Regulation should be viewed as a complex and provisional process
mediated through institutions and conducted by social forces. Given these
points, the Waitangi Tribunal should be viewed as a state-formed regulatory
body that assisted the state to institutionalise Māori dissent and political
activism as part of the Post-Fordist regulatory regime that began to emerge and
then expand in New Zealand throughout the 1980s.
For the Tribunal to institutionalise Māori protest and dissent, it had to be
able to attract Māori claimants to its processes. The Tribunal developed in ways
that enabled it to attract claimants by appearing to be more responsive to Māori
grievances than the formal court system. The ability of the Tribunal to attract
claims enhanced as it proactively moved from replicating the process of the
formal justice system to the ‘informal’ formalism of marae protocol. The
changes can be shown by contrasting the reaction to the first hearing by the
Tribunal and then subsequent hearings that were altered to attract Māori
claimants.
The first hearing of the Tribunal was in Auckland on the 30 May 1977.
The claim was made by a Mr Hawke relating to fishing rights of the Ngāti
Whātua (Waitangi Tribunal, 1978). Williams (1989) writes that the Tribunal
attempted to establish the atmosphere of formal court proceedings, and also
tried to narrow the claim to one of legal niceties. Williams (1989) and Sharp
(1997) also note the choice of location for the hearing, the Ballroom of the
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Hotel Intercontinental, and the processes employed, were highly inappropriate
for the hearing. No attempt was made to use Māori customs and the
chairperson referred to it as a Magistrate’s Court (Catalinac, 2004). From this it
is possible to see that the Tribunal in the beginning had the formality and
processes of the formal justice system. However, as Sharp (1997, p. 77) writes
‘the Māori people for whose benefit it was primarily designed did not like its
manner of proceeding according to formal, legal, Pākehā practice’.
The response by claimants to the formality of Tribunal hearings and its
restricted jurisdiction was clearly shown by the small number of claims to go
before the Tribunal during the initial years of its operation. Just fourteen claims
were lodged in the first nine years of its existence to 1984. However, this
changed as the processes and operations of the Tribunal were altered, as shown
in the Motonui claim. Lodged in 1982, the Te Atiawa tribe argued that the
Motonui Synthetic Fuel project would pollute their traditional fishing grounds
(Waitangi Tribunal, 1989). Notably, the hearing was held on a marae, without
formal legal procedures, instead using marae protocol. Temm (1990) notes that
Pākehā legal formality did not seem appropriate on a marae, so it was decided
that marae kawa (protocols) would be adopted for each hearing. It was also
decided that legal formalities such as paper work would be kept to a minimum
in order to ensure the Tribunal worked in an orderly and efficient manner, but
also, because it was important that ‘the Waitangi Tribunal be in every sense a
people’s court’ (Temm, 1990: 9). After this claim, hearings were held on home
marae, replacing the appearance of legal formalism.
In 1985, the amendment to the Treaty of Waitangi Act allowed
retrospective claims back to 1840, and increased the membership of the
Tribunal to a Chairperson plus six others, four of whom were to be Māori. By
using Māori custom, more fully incorporating Māori in its processes, and
eventually being able to examine historical grievances, the Tribunal was able to
present itself as a body able to address and resolve Māori claims in an
‘appropriate manner’. By the beginning of 1994, claims lodged with the
Tribunal had increased to 400 (Kneebone, 1994). Thus, in the period covering
the late 1970s to the late 1980s, the Tribunal arguably transformed itself from a
formal body of justice, to that of an informal justice forum that engaged with
Māori on their terms; at least as far as protocol was concerned. The Tribunal
was able to gain acceptance from Māori by making decisions that not only
recognised past injustices, but also produced tangible, albeit unintended, results.

34

New Zealand Sociology Volume 26 Special Issue 2011

Abel (1982) writes that because the state presents itself as the only
legitimate source of legal authority, other processes, for example
communitarian justice, require its support to provide the necessary legitimacy
for their survival. This was demonstrated in the New Zealand context by the
1987 New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney General case. The 1987 court
decision gave the Tribunals interpretation in favour of Māori claimants the
orthodoxy of informed opinion. Renwick (1993) argues that this had three
important effects upon Māori and the Tribunal. Firstly, the legitimacy of the
Tribunal for Māori was enhanced by the formal recognition of the validity of
the forum’s interpretations and deliberations. Secondly, it demonstrated that
informalist processes could find in favour of Māori interests, and that going to
the Tribunal would not be a waste of time or resources. Thirdly, arguably the
decision was instrumental in changing the character of Māori activism by
moving protests from the street to the Tribunal process, where many Māori
began to believe that justice could now be achieved. Renwick (1993, p.11)
underlines the counter-hegemonic potentialities of the Tribunal when he
contends that during this period in Tribunal history, ‘Māori advocacy… moved
beyond protest marches to hearings of the Waitangi Tribunal, the courts, the
committee rooms of parliament and the offices of Ministers of the Crown... The
process has growing legitimacy in Māori minds’.
This development had a demonstrable effect on Māori protests during the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Protests that were previously loud and visible
moved from being confrontational to conciliatory (Sharp, 1997; see also Gagne,
2009, p. 42). As a result, grievants (more commonly referred to by media and
politicians as ‘radicals’) who did not use the path offered by the Tribunal had
their complaints labelled illegitimate. Arguably then, a key outcome of the
Tribunal process was State containment of Māori radicalism and the
incorporation of Māori political discourse. Kelsey (1992, p.601) underlines this
argument when she wrote that:
…those who harbour grievances are persuaded to abandon radical
measures, such as boycotts or militant action, in favour of orderly and
peaceful resolution under the protection of informal state institutions.
The conflict is redefined, its manifestation controlled within stateprescribed limits and the demands of the grievants moderated...
Continued resort to extra-legal tactics by other grievants can be
discredited by reference to those who have accepted the opportunity,
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which the state has provided, to address their concerns responsibly
[our emphasis].
In effect, Māori were directed towards a state-sanctioned process which worked
as an informal justice body independent of the formal system. However, while
the Tribunal may have become the environment where the struggle over Māori
claims was contained, ongoing regulation of socio-political discontent was
never absolute. As Jessop (1991, p.73) writes ‘since there are no institutional
guarantees that struggles will always be contained within these forms and/or
resolved in ways that reproduce these forms, the stability of an accumulation
regime or mode of regulation is always relative, always partial, and always
provisional’. So, while Māori gained from the Tribunal process in terms of
positive claims decisions and successful court actions to temporarily halt
government legislation, these successes were very much unintended
consequences of the Tribunal’s regulatory process and, more importantly for
our argument, extremely rare.
According to Merry (1992), state-controlled informal justice institutions
may provide indigenous peoples, such as Māori, an opportunity to push the
boundaries of the imposed regulatory ordering and mould them to better suit
their needs. However, despite the contestability of control over informal
processes, in practice the state can employ a number of tactics to maintain or
regain control of the regulatory environment, including reconstituted legislation,
withdrawal of financial support and/or constructing new processes and
strategies that divert focus away from a domain that may threaten state interests,
although these may begin working in unintended ways. For example, in
response to the Tribunal recommending the return of 44 hectares of private land
in the Te Roroa claim, the Crown passed legislation in 1992 to prevent any
further recommendations on the return of private land, excepting only the 1988
State Enterprises Act in relation to State Owned Enterprises. One reason for
this has been the pressure exerted by the Government upon the Tribunal against
employing their powers under this Act (Gibbs, 2006). This was demonstrated in
March 1997, when the Tribunal touted the possibility of this section of the Act
being used in relation to the Muriwhenua claim. The State’s response was to
threaten that such a mandatory ruling would result in the limited settlement fund
(set under the Fiscal Envelope, see discussion below) for all claims collapsing,
thereby leaving a significant number of claims unresolved. The Tribunal
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quickly backed down, recommending only that the Crown should enter into
direct negotiations with the claimants (see Barlow, 1997 and Hubbard, 1997).
Given this example, it is possible to suggest that the Tribunal formed the
initial basis of a Post-Fordist regulation of Māori claims during the late 1970s
and throughout most of 1980s. However, the lack of action by both the fourth
Labour and the following National Government in acting upon the Tribunal’s
recommendations throughout this period, resulted in rising dissatisfaction from
Māori with the claims processes by the early 1990s (Kneebone, 1994). It is at
this point that government policy was reformulated into a claims resolution
process based on direct negotiation with iwi. The first major pan-tribal Treaty
settlement extinguished Māori fishing rights in exchange for a limited 1989
settlement, and a share in fishing assets in the Sealords company in 1992,
known as the Sealords deal. 5 Iwi were then encouraged to compete for a limited
land claims settlement fund, labelled the Fiscal Envelope. Those iwi who chose
to participate would have their outstanding Treaty claims extinguished in
exchange for a limited financial settlement, while iwi that refused the envelope
process were unlikely to receive compensation. The regulatory environment
that had been initiated through the Tribunal, and dominated by it, was overtaken
by the Fiscal Envelope process, and thereafter by the Government favouring the
strategy of direct negotiation with iwi claimants. This change in the regulatory
environment signalled the beginning of the end of the Tribunal as a significant
process in the State’s regulation of Māori dissent, in particular those associated
with Treaty grievances 6 .
Conclusion
The emergence of the Waitangi Tribunal can be explained by the development
of a Post-Fordist mode of regulation. The historical basis of Māori Treaty
grievances emanated largely from the alienation of land that occurred during the
colonial context and throughout the 20th century. Legislation supported this
5

Under the terms of this agreement, the government provided Māori with 150 million dollars towards
purchasing a half share in the Sealords company, with Brierley Investments as the joint venture
partner. By agreeing to this deal, Māori effectively signed away their commercial fishing rights as
guaranteed under the various articles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Webb, 1998).
6
Joseph (2000, p. 61) posits another possible explanation for the eventually sidelining of the Tribunal,
and for Government attempts to nullify its powers: ‘[t]he Tribunal’s work evolved in the midst of a
collision between two contradictory forces: on the one hand, a genuine political will to improve the
situation for Māori; on the other, a new commitment to neo-liberal economic policies that transformed
state structures and undermined the capacity to fulfil the promises generated by that political will’.
Arguably, the Tribunal’s willingness to even signal the possible use of its powers, thereby effecting
Crown control over resource allocation, was a potential stumbling block to the neo-liberal idea (see
also Kelsey, 1993).
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acquisition and throughout the pre-Fordist and Fordist eras, the state was able to
regulate Māori protests either by ignoring them or channelling them towards
formal, legal processes, where grievances were less likely to interrupt the
processes of capital accumulation.
The Tribunal emerged during a crumbling Fordist regime of
accumulation and the rise of Post-Fordism in the New Zealand context. The
establishment of the Tribunal can be understood as a consequence of the
transition to the new mode of accumulation and the concomitant need to ensure
the continuation of a capital friendly social order. However, the development of
the Tribunal should not be viewed as the direct result of planning by certain
interest groups to regulate or control Māori claims. The analysis presented here
shows the non-intentional development of the Tribunal into a mode of
informalist regulation, where strategic conduct by the State may have only been
used to impose coherence and direction on an already emergent structure.
The increased use of informal procedures by the Tribunal throughout the
1980s can also be seen as a change in the mode of regulation from Fordist to
Post-Fordist regimes, where dissent is channelled into an institution that defines
the limits of the justice that can be dispensed. The less formal procedures
developed by the Tribunal attracted Māori claimants, which incorporated their
activism within the state-controlled apparatus. Thus, the Tribunal functioned as
a Post-Fordist mode of regulation by incorporating Māori grievances in ways
that nullified their potential to threaten the hegemonic legitimacy of the New
Zealand state.
The final chapter in the role of the Waitangi Tribunal as a key component
in the Post-Fordist regulation of Māori socio-political dissent is now playing
out. Since the mid 1990s, the position of the Tribunal in the regulatory
hierarchy was supplanted by the Fiscal Envelope (Robinson, 2002), with its cap
on resourcing of Treaty claims, and more contemporarily by the favour shown
by all participants to the strategy of direct negotiation. This is not to say the
Tribunal is totally irrelevant, as it remains important to some iwi and other
Māori organisations for the role it plays in the preparation of Treaty claims.
However, its part in the process of regulation and control of Māori activism has
been usurped by the recognition by senior politicians of the ideological and
fiscal benefits to be had from taking direct control of State-iwi engagement.
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